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Abstract
In this paper we design an incentive mechanism for heterogeneous Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs). The
proposed mechanism tackles a core problem of such systems: how to induce coordination of DTN relays in order
to achieve a target performance figure, e.g., delivery probability or end-to-end delay, under a given constraint in
term of network resources, e.g., number of active nodes or energy consumption. Also, we account for the realistic
case when the cost for taking part in the forwarding process varies with the devices’ technology or the users’
habits. Finally, the scheme is truly applicable to DTNs since it works with no need for end-to-end connectivity.
In this context, we first introduce the basic coordination mechanism leveraging the notion of a Minority Game.
In this game, relays compete to be in the population minority and their utility is defined in combination with
a rewarding mechanism. The rewards in turn configure as a control by which the network operator controls the
desired operating point for the DTN. To this aim, we provide a full characterization of the equilibria of the game in
the case of heterogeneous DTNs. Finally, a learning algorithm based on stochastic approximations provably drives
the system to the equilibrium solution without requiring perfect state information at relay nodes or at the source
node and without using end-to-end communications to implement the rewarding scheme. We provide extensive
numerical results to validate the proposed scheme.
Index Terms
Minority Game, Energy Efficiency, Heterogeneous Delay Tolerant Networks, Nash equilibria, Learning algo-
rithms, Mechanism Design.
I. INTRODUCTION
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) are designed to sustain communications with no need for persistent
connectivity. As such, they configure as a mean to exchange data without the help of dedicated network
infrastructure. As described in related literature [9], [22], the way to overcome disconnections in such
systems is by message replication. The replication mechanism resembles an epidemics where the infection
is represented by the data generated by a source node and the infected nodes are those which fetch data
from peer nodes.
In practice, DTNs composed by mobile devices could include smartphones, tablets or other devices using
multiple wireless interfaces. For such devices, OS APIs are available to program dedicated applications
for direct data exchange with peer nodes during radio range contacts.
Using such a flexible mechanism for communication, DTN networks can use mobile terminals as
information carriers: as such, they can be employed to off-load infrastructure networks during critical
demand situations. This is the case of modern flashcrowds or similar events: they represent a peculiar
novel type of hotspot scenario were infrastructured networks are overused. In these events, due to the high
densities of user-generated contents related to a specific geographic location, the operator faces massive
demand on the limited spectrum of infrastructure networks, therefore leading to deteriorating wireless
quality for all subscribers. The solution that is classically adopted by operators in this context is to deploy
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contingency sites to increase coverage, with the incurred costs for installation, removal and overall network
engineering for interference mitigation.
These contingency solutions are designed for specific events: in that scenario, the appeal of DTNs is
precisely that they are flexible in that users act directly as relays thus contributing to reducing infrastructure
costs while ensuring good coverage. Furthermore, users can keep data exchange local, e.g., event-related
information can be disseminate immediately among the participants with no need to outreach remote
servers. This architecture is thus expected to reduce network costs, while offering a new service that may
interest a large community of users.
In order to make a DTN for local data exchange truly operational, several technical issues need to be
tackled in order. To date, the most attention from the research community has been attracted on how to
route messages reliably towards the intended destination(s). Replication of the original message by the so
called epidemic routing protocol ensures that at least some copy will reach the destination node with high
probability minimizing the delay to reach the intended destinations. In turn, the standard optimization
problem becomes how to maximize the delivery probability under constraints on the resources spent to
forward it to the destination. Several papers have further extended the possible optimization to the use of
activation and/or forwarding control at relays [16].
In this paper we rather focus on a fundamental aspect that is usually overlooked in DTN literature,
namely, the autonomous activation problem. DTN performance optimization is usually made under the
implicit assumption that relays are willing to cooperate with the source node. But, core point is whether
owners of relay devices, e.g., either smartphones or tables, are willing to have battery depleted to sustain
DTNs communications. In turn, massive de-activation of relays becomes a core threat which hinders any
possible attempt to optimize network performance.
To this respect, a fundamental observation is that relays may have heterogeneous energy requirements
and so does the cost for activation they experience [4], [8]. In fact, there are two main sources of
heterogeneity that we need to model. First, DTN nodes may belong to different categories, e.g., PDA,
laptop, mobile and/or have related communication/energy-autonomy features. Those are determined by
transmission range, mobility, memory, energy capacity and active radio interface such as WiFi and
Bluetooth. Second, heterogeneity also includes differences in behavior of devices’ owners[20]. This covers
a realistic scenario in which the cost experienced by users to activate is related to their activities and the
priority they give to tasks other than relay operations, e.g., facebook updates or phone calls may be
prioritized over relaying activities depending on the user profile.
Contribution of the paper: The main contribution proposed lies in the design of a credit-based mechanism
for relay participation in DTNs. Our mechanism design attains a twofold objective. First, the decision
to participate to relaying or not is taken autonomously by relays according to the incentive scheme, i.e.,
the choice to activate or not depends on the local decision taken by the device and no centralized signal
exchange is required. Second, since incentives engender a competition among relays that play strategies
on their activation, they can be driven to attain a desired operating point for the DTN. Such an operating
point, in turn, is precisely the solution of a joint optimization problem involving the number of active
relays.
Thus, the reward offered is a control variable by which the source can tune the number of relays taking
part to the forwarding process. To do so, we define a specific utility structure as linear combination of the
success probability of a relay and the energy cost for activation. The success of a tagged relay depends
on the number of active opponents met: the bigger the number of relays participating to the message
delivery, the higher the delivery probability for the message, but indeed the less the chance for the tagged
relay to receive a reward from the system. Furthermore, we will consider different information scenarios:
message sources may have different information about the energy cost of relays. In the first scenario,
the heterogeneity of energy is based on the type of device (e.g., tablet, iPad, smartphone, laptop, access
point). Sources can identify the type of devices at each contact, thus the game is played under complete
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information on the energy cost of each class. In the second scenario, we associate the energy cost to the
activity of devices’ owners or their profile.1
More in detail, our approach is grounded into the theory of the Minority Game (MG) [15] which
tunes performance of competing relays and welfare of the DTN (number of message copies and delivery
message). We thoroughly investigate the properties of our coordination game in which relays compete to
be in the population minority.
Remark 1: A peculiar requirement for our credit exchange mechanism is that it does not require end-to-
end communications. Due to the fact that feedback messages in DTNs may incur into large delays, in fact,
the exchange of credits between relays should not require feedback messages. In order to overcome lack
of feedback, our solution adopts a learning algorithm based on stochastic approximations. This algorithm
performs in distributed fashion and operates based on local estimates performed by relays. As such, it is
fully decentralized with no need to reconstruct full state information neither at the source nor at relays.
Background on Minority Game and incentive mechanisms:
The Minority Game. The standard minority game studies how individuals of a population of competing
agents may reach a form of coordination when sharing resources for which the utility decreases in the
number of players. The MG was first introduced in literature as a simplification of the El Farol Bar’s
attendance problem [15], [12]. In the El Farol bar problem [10] N users decide independently whether
to go or not to the unique bar in Santa Fe that offers entertainment. However, the bar is small, and they
enjoy only if at most Ψ of the possible N attendees are present, in which case they obtain a reward r
at a cost 0 ≤ c ≤ r for going to the bar. Otherwise, they can stay home and watch stars with utility 0.
Players have two actions: go if they expect the attendance to be less than Ψ people or stay at home if
they expect the bar will be overcrowded.
The extension of the game introduces a learning component based on the belief of future attendance
that every player has: the only information available is the number of people who came to El Farol in
past weeks [18],[17],[14] .
Incentive-based schemes for DTNs. Several incentive schemes have been recently proposed for DTNs.
For example, [19] uses Tit-for-Tat (TFT) to design an incentive-aware routing protocol that allows selfish
DTN nodes to maintain hight performance while satisfying TFT constraints. Mobicent [7] is an incentive-
compatible system which uses credit with cryptographic method to incentive selfish nodes to forward
packets. PI [13] attaches an incentive on the sending bundle to stimulate the selfish nodes to cooperate in
message delivery. SMART [23] is a secure multilayer credit-based incentive system for DTNs. In SMART,
layered coins are used to provide incentives to selfish DTN nodes for bundle forwarding. MobiGame [21]
is a user-centric and social-aware reputation based incentive scheme for DTNs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the system model
and the notation used throughout the paper. Results for the equilibria of the MG in device-dependent
heterogeneous DTNs are derived in in Sec. IV. The extension to the incomplete information scenario in
user-dependent heterogeneous DTN is provided in Sec. V. A distributed reinforcement learning algorithm
able to drive the system to the desired operating point is derived in Sec. VI. Numerical results for validating
the outcomes of the theoretical analysis are reported and discussed in Sec. VII. Final remarks are reported
in Sec. IX.
II. NETWORK MODEL
In this section, we present the overall architecture and key insight into our mechanism design.
1In view of the reward mechanism proposed, this scenario can also reflect the importance for a tagged user to use the DTN to exchange
its own messages since it can act as both a relay and a source.
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A. System architecture and reward mechanism
We consider a DTN with several source-destination pairs si and N relay nodes. Relay nodes are equipped
with a wireless interface allowing communication with other mobiles in their proximity. Messages are
generated at the source nodes and need to be delivered to the destination nodes. The network is assumed to
be sparse: nodes are isolated with high probability at any time instant.2 Communication opportunities arise
whenever two nodes fall within reciprocal radio range, i.e., a “contact” occurs. We assume contacts last
enough to ensure the transmission of all data needed for a message relaying. Also, we assume that inter
contact times between any pair of nodes are independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables.
Note that to this respect our framework generalizes i.i.d. models proposed in literature to mimic synthetic
mobility processes, e.g., Random Walk or Random Waypoint, since we allow for general intermeeting
distributions, which may well include heavy tailed ones.
A source attempts to deliver a message to destination generating several copies among relays. Each
such copy contains a time stamp indicating its age and can be dropped when it becomes irrelevant, e.g.,
after time τ . τ is also the horizon by which we intend to optimize network performance. Due to lack of
permanent connectivity, we exclude the use of feedback that allows the relays or sources to know whether
the message has been successfully delivered to its destination or not. For the same reason, the design of
our activation mechanism should not require centralized coordination nor full state information and any
such scheme should indeed run fully distributed on board of the relay nodes.
Let gj be the energy cost for relay node j when it remains active during [0, τ ]. This cost captures the
heterogeneity of nodes in DTN in terms of cost for activation.
Now assume that aim is to achieve a target performance figure (e.g., delivery probability, end-to-end
delay). Without loss of generality, we focus on the probability of successful delivery. However, our results
extend to any performance measure monotonically increasing with the number of active relays. Given
target performance figure and the parameters of the DTN (e.g., mobility, transmission range, density
of nodes), it is possible to estimate the number of nodes which should activate, named Ψ, in order to
guarantee this target figure. Now the question is how to stimulate Ψ user nodes to participate to delivery
message in a distributed manner.
To this aim each source s proposes a reward for relays. For instance, the reward can be a certain number
of credits that relays may use to send their own messages over the DTN. Also, the reward rsj is based
on the type of device j. In fact, nodes with larger battery capacity might choose to be more active to
collect the reward, while nodes with a limited battery capacity may participate less to save energy.3 In
particular, the relay node of type j receives a positive reward rsj if and only if it is the first one to deliver
the message to the corresponding destination.
Overall, sources satisfy performance requirements by activating relays by rewarding: larger rewards
engender more nodes to be active which yields higher delivery probability at the expense of battery
depletion and network’s lifetime. This trade-off rises the following question: How to define the reward in
order to activate enough relay nodes such as to attain the assigned performance figure?
The answer to this question is investigated hereafter.
B. Network Game
When a message is generated by a source node, competition is engendered by the general incentive
mechanism during the message lifetime τ . Each mobile has two strategies: either to participate to for-
warding, i.e., pure strategy transmit (T ), or not to participate, i.e., pure strategy silent (S). Each strategy
corresponds to a certain utility for the relay. Clearly, the payoff of a relay should depend on the actions
2This is also the case when disruption caused by mobility occurs at a fast pace compared to the typical operation time of protocols, e.g.,
the TPC/IP protocol suite.
3We assume that the source is able to distinguish between classes according to node’s type (whether it is a throwbox, a smartphone, etc)
and determine the reward for each node according its type.
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performed by N − 1 opponent mobiles. In our mechanism, the utility is designed such in a way that,
for each player in the game, it is worth playing a given action if the number of peer nodes that adopt
the same strategy does not exceed Ψ, i.e., fraction of the total population of interacting nodes. In fact,
mobiles of each class j who take the minority action, within the tagged class, win, whereas the majority
loses. To this respect activation threshold Ψ is the minority rule of our game.
Let’s now detail how the minority game develops. Assume target probability of successful delivery
Dssucc:
Dssucc ≥ D
th
succ. (1)
From the sources’ point of view, the probability of successful delivery of a message is given by
Dssucc(|NT |) = 1−
∏
k∈NT
Qkτ , (2)
where NT is the set of active relay nodes and Qkτ is the probability that node k fails to relay the copy of
the message to the destination. Then 1 −Qkτ is the probability that the tagged node succeeds to rely the
copy of the message to the destination within time τ . The expression of Qkτ depends on the distribution
of the inter-meeting intervals.
The number Ψ of active relays will then define such as that target performance figure Dssucc(Ψ) = Dthsucc
.
Formally, let kT (kS) be the number of agents selecting strategy T (resp. S). A tagged relay playing
strategy T is member of the minority if kT ≤ Ψ, otherwise it loses; silent agents win as kS ≤ N−Ψ. Hence
the total reward of an active relay in class j is given by Rj =
∑
s r
s
jP
s
succ(T, k, s), where P ssucc(T, k, s) is
the probability that an active node (of class j) receives reward rsj from source s when k nodes are active.
For the sake of simplicity and clearness we assume that every node has the same probability to meet a
source and thus all sources use the same mechanism reward, i.e., rsj = rj . Hence the total reward of a
relay of type j becomes R = nsrjPsucc(T, k, s), where ns is the number of sources in the network.
In the rest of the paper, we make a key assumption on function Psucc(T, k, s) which follows naturally
since only the first relay to deliver obtains the reward:
Assumption A: Psucc(T, k, s) is decreasing in the number of active relays k.
III. HOMOGENEOUS ENERGY COST
In this section we study a homogeneous DTN (in terms of energy cost). We consider all nodes have
the same energy cost gj = g, ∀j. Now we can introduce two utility functions for our game, under the
assumption that the population of sources is homogeneous: P ssucc(T, k, s) = Psucc(T, k) ∀s:
Scenario 1: Zero-sum utility
U(T, kT ) =
∑
s
rs · P ssucc(T, kT , s)− gτ, U(S, kS) = −U(T, kT )
Scenario 2: Fixed regret utility
U(T, kT ) =
∑
s
rs · P ssucc(T, kT , s)− gτ, U(S, kS) = −α, ∀ kS
where in the second case the utility of non-active nodes expresses the regret or satisfaction for not
participating to message relaying. In particular, we assume α ≥ 0, and we define kαT such that U(T, kαT ) =
−α.
The formulation of Scenario 1, requires nodes to estimate Psucc. This can be calculated over time by
interrogating neighboring nodes and averaging their success rate: this amounts to run a pairwise averaging
protocol as in [11]. In case we want to avoid the use of gossip mechanisms, we can model regret of non-
active nodes as a constant negative perceived utility, which corresponds to Scenario 2.
Later on, we provide the exact characterization of the equilibria induced by the game: we distinguish
pure Nash equilibria and mixed Nash equilibria.
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A. Pure Nash Equilibrium
The Nash Equilibrium in pure strategy for our game is given by the relation :
U(S, kT ) ≥ U(T, kT + 1) and U(S, kT − 1) ≤ U(T, kT ) (3)
Thus, no player can improve its utility by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium.
Proposition 1: Under assumption A, there exists a pure Nash Equilibrium for our game. Moreover
(i) for scenario 1, there exists a unique NE obtained when exactly Ψ among the total population of N
nodes play T .
(ii) for scenario 2, there exists two Nash equilibria which are obtained when the total number of active
relays is such that: kT ∈ {kαT , kαT − 1}
Proof: Scenario 1: First, we show that kT = Ψ is a pure Nash equilibrium:
U(S,Ψ) = U(T,Ψ) = 0 ≥ U(T,Ψ + 1).
which is first condition (3-1). In the same way
U(S,Ψ− 1) = −U(T,Ψ− 1) ≤ 0 = U(T,Ψ)
and we have second condition (3-2).
Second, we show that at the NE: (kT , kS) = (Ψ, N −Ψ). By contradiction: let kT > Ψ⇒ U(S, kT ) ≥
U(T, kT + 1), i.e., (3-1) holds. However,
U(S, kT − 1) = −U(T, kT − 1) ≥ 0 > U(T, kT )
and (3-2) fails. Conversely, let kT < Ψ⇒ U(S, kT − 1) ≤ U(T, kT ) so that (3-2) holds. But,
U(S, kT ) = −U(T, kT ) < 0 ≤ U(T, kT + 1)
and (3-1) fails. Hence, kT = Ψ is the only possible pure Nash equilibrium.
Scenario 2: Let kT ∈ {kαT , kαT − 1} we have,{
U(S, kT ) = −α = U(T, kαT ) ≥ U(T, kT + 1),
U(S, kT − 1) = −α = U(T, k
α
T ) ≤ U(T, kT ),
where equality holds in the first relation for kT = kαT − 1 and in the second for kT = kαT . We show that
if kT 6∈ {kαT , kαT − 1} then (kT , N − kT ) then (3-1) or (3-2) fails. In fact, if kT > kαT we have,
U(S, kT ) = −α = U(T, k
α
T ) ≥ U(T, kT + 1), but:
U(S, kT − 1) = −α = U(T, k
α
T ) > U(T, kT )
Second, if kT < kαT − 1 we have,
U(S, kT − 1) = −α = U(T, k
α
T ) < U(T, kT ), but:
U(S, kT ) = −α = U(T, k
α
T ) < U(T, kT + 1)
Which concludes the proof for the second scenario. 
Remark 2: A crucial design issue is how to relate the parameters of the game to the performance of
the DTN at the equilibrium. From (2), the number of active nodes required to attain Dthsucc needs to verify
kthT (k
th
T + 1) =
2 log(1−Dthsucc)
log(Qτ )
. Besides, from Proposition 1 it must be Ψ = kthT . We obtain:
r∗ = gτ
1
nsPsucc(T, kthT )
Message reward r at the equilibrium is proportional to energy cost g through a positive constant.
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B. Mixed Nash Equilibrium
Let’s consider now that relay nodes maintain a probability distribution over the two actions. Compared
to pure strategy game, in the mixed strategy game every node can define the strategy by which it will
be active only for a fraction of the time and stay silent the rest of the time. This kind of equilibrium is
desirable for an homogeneous population of nodes with similar energy constraints.
In the mixed strategy game, node i can choose to play action T with probability pi and play S with
probability (1 − pi). We let, p = (p1, p2, ..., pN), pi ≥ 0, ∀i the mixed strategy profile of our game. If
0 < pi < 1, ∀i then p is a fully mixed strategy profile of the game. A standard companion notation that
we use for p is (pi,p−i): it denotes the strategy profile of the game when relay i uses strategy pi and
others use p−i = (p1, .., pi−1, pi+1, .., pN). Let’s denote by Ui(p˜,p−i) the utility of node i playing action
T with probability p˜. We have the following definition of the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium:
Definition 1: (i) A mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium specifies a mixed strategy p∗i ∈ [0, 1] for each
player i (where i = 1 . . .N) such that :
Ui(p
∗
1, .., p
∗
i−1, p
∗
i , p
∗
i+1, .., p
∗
N) ≥ Ui(p
∗
1, .., p
∗
i−1, pi, p
∗
i+1, .., p
∗
N) (4)
for every mixed strategy pi ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) We call a Fully mixed Nash Equilibrium a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium p = (p1, .., pi, .., pN)
with pi 6∈ {0, 1}, ∀i.
From now on we will denote by the term ’mixer’ a relay who uses a mixed strategy 0 < pi < 1. The
following proposition states that any mixed equilibrium p with pi 6∈ {0, 1}∀i, is symmetric, i.e. pi = p ∀i.
This result comes from the fact that given any pair of mixers, a player is better off if the other chooses
differently. Moreover, at the equilibrium each player must be indifferent on whether it is active or silent.
Proposition 2: Assume assumption A holds. Let p be the mixed strategy profile of our game s.t pi 6∈
{0, 1}, then at the equilibrium, all mixers must use the same probability p, i.e., pi = pj ∀ mixer i, j.
Proof: Assume that the set of mixers is not empty and let suppose that there are l relays that select pure
strategy T and r pure strategy S. Without loss of generality let the strategy profile at the equilibrium :
p = (p1, . . . , pN−l−r, 1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0)
Scenario 1: The utility for a mixer relay i writes
Ui(p˜,p−i) = (2p˜i − 1)W (p1, p2, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pN)
with
W (p1, p2, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pN) =
N−l−r∏
j 6=i
(1− pj)U(T, l + 1) +
N−l−r∑
j 6=i
pj
N−l−r∏
j′ 6∈{i,j}
(1− pj′)U(T, l + 2) +
N−l−r∑
j,j′ 6=i
pjpj′
N−l−r∏
j′′ 6∈{i,j,j′}
(1− pj′′)U(T, l + 3) + ...+
N−l−r∏
j 6=i
pjU(T,N − r).
Note about this function that:
• W is strictly decreasing by any unilateral increase of pj by node j. This comes from the fact that
the utility function of an active node is decreasing with the number of active nodes (assumption A).
• For any two mixers j 6= j′, pj and pj′ are indifferently interchangeable variables in W .
At mixed equilibrium p, ∂Ui(p)
∂p˜i
= 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , N − l − r}. This implies that:
W (p1, p2, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pN) = 0, ∀ mixer i
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. Now suppose that there exists two mixers i and j, s.t. p∗i 6= p∗j . Without lost of generality assume that
p∗i < p
∗
j , then
0 = W (p, .., pi−1, pi+1, .., pj, .., pN) > W (p1, .., pi−1, pi+1, .., pi, .., pN)
= W (p1, .., pj−1, pj+1, .., pN) > 0
which is absurd. Thus pi = pj, ∀ mixers i, j.
Scenario 2: As in Scenario 1, the utility perceived by a given mixer i when the strategy profile is
p = (p1, p2, . . . , pN) is given by:
Ui(p˜,p−i) = p˜iW
′
(p−i)− α(1− p˜i)
[N−l−r∏
j 6=i
(1− pj) +
N−l−r∑
j 6=i
pj
N−l−r∏
j′ 6∈{i,j}
(1− pj′)
+
N−l−r∑
j,j′ 6=i
pjpj′
N−l−r∏
j′′ 6∈{i,j,j′}
(1− pj′′) + ... +
N−l−r∏
j 6=i
pj
]
At the equilibrium we have, ∀ mixer i, ∂Ui(P)
∂pi
= W
′
(p−i) = 0, where W
′ has exactly the same shape as
W with U(T, k) replaced by U(T, k) + α, k ∈ {l + 1, . . . , N − r}. We then use the same reasoning as
done with function W and conclude that, p∗i = p∗j , ∀ mixers i, j. 
In the following corollary, we restrain the result of proposition 2 to the special case when every nodes
act as mixers.
Corollary 1: Under assumption A, any fully mixed equilibrium p with pi 6∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, is symmetric,
i.e. pi = p ∀i.
The following proposition characterize the existence and uniqueness of a fully mixed Nash Equilibrium.
Proposition 3: Under assumption A, there exists a unique fully mixed Nash Equilibrium p∗. Moreover,
p
∗ is solution to:
• Scenario 1 :
A(N, p∗) =
N∑
k=1
CN−1k−1 (p
∗)k−1(1− p∗)N−kU(T, k) = 0. (5)
• Scenario 2 :
A′(N, p∗) =
N∑
k=1
CN−1k−1 (p
∗)k−1(1− p∗)N−k[U(T, k) + α] = 0.
Proof: Let p the symmetric mixed strategy adopted by every node in the game, pi = p, ∀i.
Scenario 1: The utility of one relay i when the strategy profile (pi, p−i) is played is given by:
Ui(p˜i, p−i) = p˜i
N∑
k=1
CN−1k−1 p
k−1
−i (1− p−i)
N−kU(T, k) + (1− p˜i)
N−1∑
k=0
CN−1k p
k
−i(1− p−i)
N−k−1U(S, k + 1)
= p˜i
N∑
k=1
CN−1k−1 p
k−1
−i (1− p−i)
N−kU(T, k) + (1− p˜i)
N∑
k=1
CN−1k−1 p
k−1
−i (1− p−i)
N−kU(S, k)
= (2p˜i − 1)
N∑
k=1
CN−1k−1 p
k−1
−i (1− p−i)
N−kU(T, k)
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Let A(N, p−i) =
N∑
k=1
CN−1k−1 p
k−1
−i (1− p−i)
N−kU(T, k)
if A(N, p−i) < 0, pi = 0 is the best response for player i and conversely, p = 1 is a best response when
A(N, p−i) > 0. A mixed strategy is obtained when A(N, p−i) = 0. Also, we have
A(N, 0) = U(T, 1) > 0 > A(N, 1) = U(T,N)
thus there exists a mixed symmetric Nash Equilibrium which is unique since A(N, p−i) is strictly de-
creasing with p. The mixed equilibrium is thus characterized by equation (5).
A(N, p∗) =
N∑
k=1
CN−1k−1 (p
∗)k−1(1− p∗)N−kU(T, k) = 0.
Scenario 2: The utility of one relay i when the strategy profile (p˜i, p−i) is played is given by:
Ui(p˜i, p−i) = p˜i
N∑
k=1
CN−1k−1 p
k−1
−i (1− p−i)
N−kU(T, k)− α(1− p˜i)
At the Nash equilibrium we have, ∀ player i, ∂Ui(p
∗)
∂p∗
= A′(N, p∗) = 0 with
A′(N, p∗) =
N∑
k=1
CN−1k−1 (p
∗)k−1(1− p∗)N−k[U(T, k) + α]
Since α is a fixed positive constant, A′(N, p∗) has the same properties as A(N, p∗) from the proof of
scenario 1. Then we easily conclude that, p∗ is unique and characterized by :
A′(N, p∗) =
N∑
k=1
CN−1k−1 (p
∗)k−1(1− p∗)N−k[U(T, k) + α] = 0.

C. Equilibrium with Mixers and Non-mixers
We study here the existence of equilibrium when the population of agents is composed of pure strategy
players: active or non-active, as well as mixers. In this case, a non-pure Nash equilibrium can be represented
by the triplet (l, r, p∗), where l, r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N} denote respectively the number of agents choosing pure
strategy T or S, and p∗ ∈ (0, 1) the probability with which the remaining N− l−r mixers choose strategy
T . Moreover, we denote by vT (l, r, p)(resp. vS(l, r, p)) the expected payoff to a player choosing T (resp.
S). The expressions of vT (l, r, p) and vS(l, r, p) write as follow:
vT (l, r, p) =
N−l−r∑
k=0
CN−l−rk p
k(1− p)N−l−r−kU(T, l + k) (6)
and
vS(l, r, p) = −
N−l−r∑
k=0
CN−l−rk p
k(1− p)N−l−r−kU(T, l + k) (7)
Proposition 4: Using the previous notations, a strategy profile of type (l, r, p∗) is a Nash equilibrium
with at least one mixer if and only if:
vT (l + 1, r, p
∗) = vS(l, r + 1, p
∗) (8)
9
We prove that this result holds for Zero-sum utility and fixed regret utility for non-active nodes(resp.
Scenario 1 and Scenario 1)
Proof: The condition (8) describes that a mixer is indifferent whether it chooses a pure strategy T or S.
This is a necessary condition for the strategy profile (l, r, p∗) to be a Nash equilibrium.
In order to show sufficiency, we need to show that pure strategy players as well, cannot improve their
expected utility through unilateral deviation from the equilibrium profile. Without loss of generality,
suppose that there is at least one player using pure strategy T , we have
vT (l, r, p
∗) ≥ vT (l + 1, r, p
∗) = vS(l, r + 1, p
∗)
≥ vS(l − 1, r + 1, p
∗)
≥ p∗vT (l, r, p
∗) + (1− p∗)vS(l − 1, r + 1, p
∗)
This last relation, states that an active user cannot improve its expected utility by unilaterally deviating
from the strategy profile (l, r, p∗) using any strategy p∗ ∈ [0, 1), given relation (8). As done for Scenario
1, in Scenario 1, we have, vS(l, r + 1, p∗) = −α, let vS(l + 1, r, p∗) = −α then:
vT (l, r, p
∗) ≥ vT (l + 1, r, p∗) = −α ≥ vS(l − 1, r + 1, p∗)
≥ p∗vT (l, r, p
∗) + (1− p∗)vS(l − 1, r + 1, p
∗)
moreover,
vS(l + 1, r − 1, p
∗) ≤ vT (l + 1, r, p
∗) = −α = vS(l, r, p
∗).
This completes the proof. 
Discussion on existence of (l, r, p∗) type equilibria
It is possible to isolate several cases where the relation (8) that characterizes a Nash Equilibrium of type
(l, r, p∗), cannot be satisfied.
We denote by, p = 0+(resp. p = 1−) the mixed strategy infinitely close to zero(resp. to one), with which
at least one mixer select to be active. Since, vT (l, r, p∗) is strictly decreasing with l and p∗, we have,
vT (l + 1, r, p
∗) = vS(l, r + 1, p
∗)
⇐⇒
{
vT (l + 1, r, 0
+) > −vT (l, r + 1, 0
+)
vT (l + 1, r, 1
−) ≤ −vT (l, r + 1, 1−),
(1) If l ≥ Ψ, then there is no Nash equilibrium of the desired type. Indeed, l > Ψ, then vT (l, r+1, 0+) ≤ 0
and
vT (l + 1, r, 0
+) ≤ 0 ≤ −vT (l, r + 1, 0
+).
Then there is no possible Nash Equilibrium according to relation (8).
(2) If l + r + 1 > N − 1, then there is no Nash equilibrium. We already have l < Ψ, let l + r + 1 = N
then,
vT (l + 1, r, p) = C1 ≥ 0 ∀ p and
vS(l, r + 1, p) = C2 > 0 ∀ p.
Since vT is decreasing with l, we have, 0 ≤ C1 < C2 which contradicts relation (8).
A Nash Equilibrium of type (l, r, p∗) exists then only for l < Ψ and for l + r ≤ N − 2, thus there are
exactly Ψ(N − 2)− Ψ(Ψ−1)
2
Nash equilibria. In the following proposition we go further and decline some
properties of the symmetric mixed strategy p∗ at the equilibrium.
Proposition 5: The mixed strategy p∗ at the equilibrium increases as r increase and reversely decreases
as l increase.
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Proof: For a fixed number l of nodes playing pure strategy T , the utility of a mixer when there are less
nodes playing pure strategy S, decreases faster than when there are more nodes playing pure strategy S.
For example we have,
∂vT (l + 1, 0, p)
∂p
>
∂vT (l + 1, 1, p)
∂p
Similarly, we will have
∂vT (l, 1, p)
∂p
>
∂vT (l, 2, p)
∂p
.
Since, vT (l + 1, 0, 0+) = vT (l + 1, 1, 0+) and vT (l, 1, 0+) = vT (l, 2, 0+) then if p∗1, p∗2 are such that
vT (l + 1, 0, p
∗
1) = −vT (l, 1, p
∗
1) and vT (l + 1, 1, p∗2) = −vT (l, 2, p∗2), it follows that p∗1 < p∗2.
The same reasoning holds for every k < k′ and p∗1, p∗2 s.t. vT (l + 1, k, p∗1) = −vT (l, k + 1, p∗1) and
vT (l + 1, k
′, p∗2) = −vT (l, k
′ + 1, p∗2) then p∗1 < p∗2.
We apply a similar reasoning reversely and conclude that for a fixed number r of nodes playing pure
strategy S, for every k < k′ and p∗1, p∗2 s.t. vT (k + 1, r, p∗1) = −vT (k, r + 1, p∗1) and
vT (k
′ + 1, r, p∗2) = −vT (k
′, r + 1, p∗2) then p∗1 > p∗2. 
Summary on characterization of equilibria: Throughout this section we have characterized the
following different equilibria : Under assumption A we have
1. pure equilibrium : We show that for the Zero-sum utility there exists a unique pure N.E. that sets at
exactly Ψ active relay nodes. For the Fixed regret utility scenario, there exists two possible N.E. for
a number of active nodes kT ∈ {kαT , kαT − 1}.
2. fully mixed equilibrium : For both scenarios we shown that any fully mixed equilibrium p with
pi 6∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, is symmetric. Moreover, the mixed N.E. of our game is unique and characterized
by : A(N, p∗) =
N∑
k=1
CN−1k−1 (p
∗)k−1(1 − p∗)N−kU(T, k) = 0 for the zero-sum utility scenario and
characterized by A′(N, p∗) =
N∑
k=1
CN−1k−1 (p
∗)k−1(1 − p∗)N−k[U(T, k) + α] = 0 for the fixed regret
scenario.
3. equilibrium with mixers and non-mixers: The last characterized type of equilibrium is related to a
population of relays composed of mixers and non-mixers. Here we shown that such type of equilibrium
is characterized by a specific relation, namely relation (8). Moreover, we established that a Nash
Equilibrium of this type exists only for l < Ψ and for l + r ≤ N − 2, thus there are exactly
Ψ(N − 2)− Ψ(Ψ−1)
2
Nash equilibria.
IV. HETEROGENEOUS DEVICES-DEPENDENT ENERGY COST
This section considers the case when the energy cost depends on the class of devices the relays belongs
to, let them be, e.g., notebook computers, ebook readers and tablet computers such as the iPad, netbooks
or smartphones.
We consider M classes of devices in the DTN. Each class contains Nj relays with N =
∑N
j=1Nj . For
the sake of clarity, we will often refer to the case M = 2. However, all results can be easily extended to
hold in general case. Assume that g1 > g2, i.e., nodes belong to class 1 have higher energy cost than class
2 when active. For example mostly devices such as smartphones have smaller power budgets compared
to laptops: in turn, their energy cost is higher. Furthermore the power consumption of the WiFi radio
represents a large fraction of the overall power consumed by a small device. Hence, we define the utility
of an active relay of class j
Uj(T, kT ) = nsrjPsucc(T, kT )− gjτ
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where rj is the reward designed by sources for class j. The utility for a silent node is Uj(S, kT ) = 0.
Now, we should characterize the number of active relay in each class j, named Ψj , able to guarantee the
target (1). Ψj is thus the per-class minority of our game for the multi-class scenario. This threshold can
be achieved using the reward mechanism r∗ = (r∗j )j=1,..,M which should obey the following relation
∀1 ≤ j ≤M : nsr
∗
jPsucc(T,Ψj) = gjτ (9)
A. Pure Nash Equilibrium
Definition 2: A Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies exists if and only if the following two conditions
to be satisfied:
∀1 ≤ j ≤M :
{
Uj(S, kT ) ≥ Uj(T, kT + 1)
Uj(S, kT − 1) ≤ Uj(T, kT )
(10)
Actually, the above statement says that no player can improve its utility by unilaterally deviating from
the equilibrium. The equilibrium of the multi-class games is as follow
Proposition 6: Let r be the reward mechanism designed by sources. Then there exists a pure Nash
equilibrium. Further, the number of active relay nodes for class j, named kT,j , is the same under all pure
Nash equilibria where kT,j is solution of
∀1 ≤ j ≤M : rjPsucc(T, kT,j) = gjτ (11)
Proof:
Assume that for any class j exactly kT,j nodes are active, then we have:{
Uj(S, kT,j) = 0 = Uj(T, kT,j) ≥ Uj(T, kT,j + 1),
Uj(S, kT,j − 1) = 0 = Uj(T, kT,j) ≤ Uj(T, kT,j),
then we have the conditions in (10) satisfied.
We now show that there are no other pure Nash equilibria. Let, for a class j, k′T,j 6= kT,j , without loss
of generality, let k′T,j > kT,j then
Uj(S, k
′
T,j) = 0 = Uj(T, kT,j) ≥ Uj(T, k
′
T,j + 1), but:
Uj(S, k
′
T,j − 1) = 0 = Uj(T, kT,j) > Uj(T, k
′
T,j)
Second, if k′T,j < kT,j we have,
Uj(S, k
′
T,j − 1) = 0 = Uj(T, kT,j) < Uj(T, k
′
T,j), but:
Uj(S, k
′
T,j) = 0 = Uj(T, kT,j) < Uj(T, k
′
T,j + 1)
and the second relation is not satisfied. Therefore at the equilibrium there are exactly kT,j active nodes.
Hence the proof. 
We note that under reward mechanism r in (11), there are ∑j=Mj=1 ( NjkT,j
)
pure Nash equilbria. Further,
under reward mechanism r∗ defined in (9), the number of active relay nodes in each class at a pure
Nash equilibrium, is Ψj with Ψ =
∑j=M
j=1 Ψj . This corresponds to the target of sources in the system.
Unfortunately the pure equilibrium could fail to achieve a certain fairness between node relays since only
a part of relay nodes participate to relaying messages. To overcome this problem, we use another concept
of equilibrium, named full mixed equilibrium, in which a relay node will be active only for a fraction of
the time. We also design a learning algorithm that allows the system to converge to a mixed equilibrium.
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B. Mixed Nash Equilibrium
Let’s consider now that relay nodes maintain a probability distribution over the two actions. Compared
to the pure strategy game, in the mixed strategy game every node can define the strategy by which it will
be active only for a fraction of the time and stay silent the rest of the time.
In the mixed strategy game, node i of class j can choose to play action T with probability pij
and play S with probability (1 − pij). Let the profile of our game in this multi-class framework p =
(p11, ..., pN11, ..., p1j, ...pNij , ..., p1M , ..., pNMM). If 0 < pij < 1, ∀i, j then p is a fully mixed strategy
profile of the game. We denote by (pij,p−i) the fully mixed strategy profile of the game when relay i of
class j uses strategy pij and others use p−i = (p11, .., pN11, .., p1j, .., pi−1j , pi+1j, .., pNjj , .., p1M , .., pNMM).
We have the following definition of the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium:
Definition 3: (i) A mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium specifies a mixed strategy p∗ij ∈ [0, 1] for each
player i (where i = 1 . . .N) such that :
U i(p∗1, .., p
∗
i−1, p
∗
i , p
∗
i+1, .., p
∗
N) ≥
U i(p∗1, .., p
∗
i−1, pi, p
∗
i+1, .., p
∗
N), ∀pi (12)
(ii) We call a Fully mixed Nash Equilibrium a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium p with pi 6∈ {0, 1}, ∀i.
Proposition 7: For any reward mechanism, at the mixed equilibrium, all players of the same class use
the same probability: pij = pj, ∀i; ∀1 ≤ j ≤M .
Proof:
The utility perceived by a given player i of class j when the strategy profile is P is given by:
U ij(p) = piWi(p−i)
with
Wi =
∏
k 6=i
(1− pk)Uj(T, 1) +
∑
k 6=i
pkm
∏
k′ 6∈{i,k}
(1− pk′m)Uj(T, 2) +
∑
k,k′ 6=i
pkmpk′m
∏
k′′ 6∈{i,k,k′}
(1− pk′′m)Uj(T, 3)
+ ...+
∏
k 6=i
pkmUj(T,N)
∀1 ≤ m ≤M . Note about this function that:
• Wi is strictly decreasing by any unilateral increase of pkm by player k of class m.
• For any two k 6= k′ of the same class m, the mixed strategies pkm, pk′m are indifferently interchange-
able variables in Wi.
At the equilibrium we have, ∀ player i, ∀1 ≤ j ≤M, ∂U
i
j(p)
∂pij
= 0. This implies that : Wi = 0. Moreover,
the strategy profile p = (p∗11, .., p∗N11, .., p
∗
1j , .., p
∗
Njj
, .., p∗1M , .., p
∗
NMM
) is a Nash equilibrium if no user can
increase its utility by any unilateral deviation. Now suppose that there exists i, k of class j, such that,
p∗ij 6= p
∗
kj . Without lost of generality assume that p∗ij < p∗kj , we have,
0 = Wi(..., p
∗
1j , ..., p
∗
i−1j, p
∗
i+1j, ..., p
∗
kj, ..., pN∗j j, ..., p
∗
NMM
)
> Wi(..., p
∗
1j , ..., p
∗
i−1j, p
∗
i+1j, ..., p
∗
ij , ..., pN∗j j , ..., p
∗
NMM
)
= Wi(..., p
∗
1j , ..., p
∗
k−1j, p
∗
k+1j, ..., pN∗j j , ..., p
∗
NMM
)
> 0
which is absurd. Thus p∗ij = p∗kj, ∀ i, k of class j. 
Let pj be the symmetric mixed strategy adopted by every node of class j, pij = pj, ∀i, j. For reasons
of clarity, we characterize the mixed strategy p∗j in a two-class scenario without any loss of generality
(consider M = 2).
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Proposition 8: Let r be the reward mechanism designed by sources. Then there exists a unique fully
mixed Nash equilibrium (p∗1, p∗2) for the multi-class case. Moreover it is the solution of, A1(N, p∗1, p∗2) =
A2(N, p
∗
1, p
∗
2) = 0 where:
A1(N, p
∗
1, p
∗
2) =
N1−1∑
k1=0
N2∑
k2=0
(CN1−1k1 p
∗k1
1 (1− p
∗
1)
N1−k1−1
CN2k2 p
∗k2
2 (1− p
∗
2)
N2−k2)U1(T, k1 + k2)
and
A2(N, p
∗
1, p
∗
2) =
N1∑
k1=0
N2−1∑
k2=0
(CN2−1k2 p
∗k2
2 (1− p
∗
2)
N2−k2−1
CN1k1 p
∗k1
1 (1− p
∗
1)
N1−k1)U2(T, k1 + k2)
Moreover,
(i) if g1
r1
= g2
r2
then we have p1 = p2.
(ii) if r1
g1
< r2
g2
then we have p1 < p2. As a consequence kT,1 < kT,2.
Proof:
The utility of an active user of Class 1 is given by:
U i1(pi1, p−i) = pi
N1−1∑
k1=0
N2∑
k2=0
(CN1−1k1 p
k1
1 (1− p1)
N1−k1−1
CN2k2 p
k2
2 (1− p2)
N2−k2)U1(T, k1 + k2) + (1− pi) ∗ 0
= pi
N1−1∑
k1=0
N2∑
k2=0
(
CN1−1k1 p
k1
1 (1− p1)
N1−k1−1
CN2k2 p
k2
2 (1− p2)
N2−k2
)
[U1(T, k1 + k2)]
= pi ∗ A1(N, p1, p2)
and utility of user i from Class 2 writes
U i2(pi2, p−i) = pi
N1∑
k1=0
N2−1∑
k2=0
(CN2−1k2 p
k2
2 (1− p2)
N2−k2−1
CN1k1 p
k1
1 (1− p1)
N1−k1)[U2(T, k1 + k2)] + (1− pi) ∗ 0
= pi ∗ A2(N, p1, p2)
where A1(N, p1, p2), A2(N, p1, p2) are defined as follows:
A1(N, p1, p2) =
N1−1∑
k1=0
N2∑
k2=0
(CN1−1k1 p
k1
1 (1− p1)
N1−k1−1
CN2k2 p
k2
2 (1− p2)
N2−k2)U1(T, k1 + k2),
and
A2(N, p1, p2) =
N1∑
k1=0
N2−1∑
k2=0
(CN2−1k2 p
k2
2 (1− p2)
N2−k2−1
CN1k1 p
k1
1 (1− p1)
N1−k1)U2(T, k1 + k2).
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At the Nash equilibrium we have, ∀ player i of class j = 1, 2, ∂U
i
j (p
∗)
∂p∗
= Aj(N, p
∗
1, p
∗
2) = 0, if Aj(N, p∗1, p∗2) <
0, p = 0 is the best response for the player i of class j and conversely, p = 1 is a best response when
Aj(N, p
∗
1, p
∗
2) > 0. A mixed strategy is obtained when Aj(N, p∗1, p∗2) = 0, ∀j ∈ 1, 2. Also, we have
Aj(N, p
∗
1, p
∗
2) is a strictly decreasing function in both p1, p2 (Assumption A). Thus there exists a mixed
Nash Equilibrium which is unique and characterized by the equation (13).
A1(N, p
∗
1, p
∗
2) = A2(N, p
∗
1, p
∗
2) = 0. (13)
Now let
C(i) =
N1−2∑
k1=0
N2−2∑
k2=0
P (K1 = k1, K2 = k2)riPsucc(T, k1 + k2 + ei + 1)
for user i, where ei = 1 if user i is active and ei = 0 otherwise. We can thus rewrite the expressions of
A1(N, p
∗
1, p
∗
2) and A2(N, p∗1, p∗2) as follows:
A1(N, p
∗
1, p
∗
2) = r1p2C(1)− r1(1− p2)C(0)− g1τ (14)
A2(N, p
∗
1, p
∗
2) = r2p1C(1)− r2(1− p1)C(0)− g2τ (15)
It follows that, A1(N, p∗1, p∗2) = A2(N, p∗1, p∗2) = 0 =⇒
p2C(1)− (1− p2)C(0) =
g1τ
r1
(16)
p1C(1)− (1− p1)C(0) =
g2τ
r2
(17)
letting g1τ
r1
= g2τ
r2
we have, p1 = p2. This completes the proof of (i).
Now, let γ1 = g1τr1 , γ2 =
g2τ
r2
then from (16) and (17) we have:
(p2 − p1)C(1) + (p2 − p1)C(0) = γ1 − γ2
⇒ (p2 − p1)(C(0) + C(1)) = γ1 − γ2
Since, C(0) > C(1) > 04, then, γ1 > γ2 ⇒ p2 > p1. This tells that in order to have fewer nodes active
in class 1 we should allocate smaller reward. However, if we go back to the definition of kT,1 and kT,2
in (11) we obtain Psucc(T, kT,1) > Psucc(T, kT,2). Under assumption A we have, kT,2 > kT,1. Hence the
proof of (ii). 
The last result specializes the minority game to a minority game with several thresholds allowing to
control the average number of active users in each class at equilibrium. Furthermore, we characterize how
sources may design a reward mechanism in order to achieve the fairness of energy consumption based on
the type of devices. For instance, if for the sake of fairness the objective is to incite more devices with
high battery capacity (i.e., class 2) to participate in forwarding compared to small devices (i.e., class 1),
our scheme under mixed equilibrium may achieve this goal by assigning a reward mechanism satisfying
the relation r2 > r1g2g1 . In section VI we will design a learning algorithm that allows sources and relays
to achieve the desired performance by taking into account energy consumption; the learning algorithm
converges to the full mixed equilibrium without requiring perfect state information at relay nodes.
Due to the complexity of the expressions, it’s in general difficult to obtain an explicit solution of (13).
We are able however to obtain numerical solution as shown in Fig. 1.
4This comes from the fact that the more number of active nodes, the less is the probability of obtaining the reward for a tagged node.
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Fig. 1. The mixed Nash equilibrium: multi-class, where g1 = 0.8×10−4, g2 = 0.5×10−4 , r2 = 0.15, λ = 0.03, τ = 100, N1 = 20, N2 =
20
V. HETEROGENEOUS USER-DEPENDENT ENERGY COST
Energy depletion at DTN nodes depends not only on the wireless technology used by relays and on
the device type but also on the device’s user behavior. Indeed, two users of identical devices may have
drastically different energy-consumption rates: some ”active” users will be draining their batteries much
faster than other users. This suggests that, beyond physical characteristics of DTN nodes, the energy cost
of DTN nodes should depend on the profile of users.
In this section we focus on how the incentive mechanism combined with the minority game framework
can drive this user-dependent energy cost system to an operating point that satisfies the performance
requirements in the incomplete information scenario. By incomplete information we mean that, since the
energy cost of a relay node is based on its activities and its behavior, sources cannot physically identify
the energy profile of a relay node. Hence we assume that each node only knows its own specific energy
cost but not those of other nodes.
On the other hand sources and relay nodes have a common information on the cumulative probability
distribution function F (·) of the energy costs in the system. However under incomplete information, a
basic approach for sources is to consider a homogeneous reward mechanism in order to achieve their
target. Homogeneity is obtained by, instead of considering the cdf F (·), assuming that the sources will
rely only on the mean µ of relays energy costs distribution.
Thus, under incomplete information, the utility function for active node i becomes
Ui(T ) = Ek [rPsucc(T, k + 1)− giτ ] ,
where the expectation is taken over k active relay nodes according to binomial distribution B(N−1, F (g))5.
Proposition 9: For any reward mechanism r, there exists a threshold-type Nash Equilibrium in which,
node i is active if and only if its energy cost gi is smaller than a threshold gi ≤ gth(r). Moreover the
threshold gth(r) is the unique solution to Θ(g) = 0, where
Θ(g) :=
N−1∑
k=0
CN−1k F
k(g)(1− F (g))N−k−1 [rPsucc(T, k + 1)− gτ ]
5Recall that cdf F (g) = P (gi ≤ g).
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Proof: Note that a relay node i decides to be active if its utility function is positive, i.e., Ui(T ) = Θ(gi) ≥ 0.
Thus it is easy to check that a relay obtains a positive utility if its energy cost gi ≤ gth(r). Thus it remains
to show there exists a unique solution gth(r) satisfies (18).
First we will show the existence of solution gth such that Θ(g) = 0. It is easy to check that:
limg→0Θ(g) > 0 and limg→ r
τ
Θ(g) < 0. Hence there exists a solution to Θ(g) = 0. The uniqueness
follows from the monotonicity of function Θ. Indeed, the first term of the function Θ is decreasing
function in F (g) since increasing F (g) engenders more active users which decreases the probability of
a relay to receive a reward from sources (Assumption A). Since the function F (g) is increasing in g, it
follows that Θ is decreasing in g. This ends our proof of the existence of unique solution gth to Θ(gth) = 0.

We observe that reward r∗ satisfies the following relation
r∗Psucc(T,Ψ) = µτ, (18)
where Ψ is the number of relay nodes at Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, a relay will decide to participate
if its effective energy cost is less or equal to the threshold value gth. But the source node relies on the mean
µ for the reward setting. A direct implication is that the source node may conversely provide more reward
than actually needed in order to expect the targeted performance level to be achieved. This is the case
when gth < µ. Here, expectation makes the opposite case also possible, i.e., for a certain expected value,
both larger and smaller values of the cost will be present depending on relays, which may add a fluctuation
dynamic of the effectively obtained performance around the actually expected target performance. This
results characterize the way how sources control the reward mechanism under incomplete information.
VI. DISTRIBUTED REINFORCEMENT LEARNING ALGORITHM
In this section we introduce a distributed reinforcement learning algorithm that permits relays to adjust
their strategies over time in the framework of the DTN MG designed for heterogeneous device-dependent
(section II) and user-dependent (section V). Taking into account the fairness of energy consumption, the
algorithm converges to the fully mixed Nash equilibrium with no need for full state information. The
analysis of convergence of the algorithm relies on a stochastic model that is associated to a continuous
time deterministic dynamics. We prove that this process converges almost surely towards an ǫ-approximate
Nash equilibrium.
In DTNs, nodes’ limited computational power and network’s sparsity require adaptive and distributed
mechanisms letting relays adapt to operating conditions at low cost. The learning algorithm proposed here
has the following attractive features:
• It is genuinely distributed: strategy updating decision is local to relays;
• It depends solely on the achieved payoffs: nodes utilize local observations to estimate their own
payoffs;
• It uses simple behavioral rule in the form of logit rule.
We assume that each relay node i has a prior perception xi of the payoff performance for each action
(To be active, or not), and makes a decision based on this piece of information using a random choice rule.
The payoff of the chosen action is then observed and is used to update the perception for that particular
action. This procedure is repeated round after round, each round of duration τ generating a discrete time
stochastic process which is the learning process.
For notation’s sake, denote A = {T, S} the set of pure strategies, and ∆i is the set of mixed strategies
for player i with i ∈ {1, ..., N}. Let V i(.) the payoff function for player i. The algorithm works in
rounds of duration τ , at round k, each relay node i takes an action aki according to a mixed strategy
πki = σi(x
k
i ) ∈ ∆i. The fully mixed strategy is generated according to the vector xki = (xkia)a∈A which
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Algorithm 1 Distributed reinforcement Learning Algorithm
1: input: k = 1, each relay node i chooses its action (T or S) according to distribution pi and set its initial perception value
x0
i
= 0.
2: while max(|xk+1
iT
− xk
iT
|, |xk+1
iS
− xk
iS
|) > ǫ do
3: Each relay node i updates its fully mixed strategy profile at iteration k according to (19).
4: Relay node i selects its actions using its updated fully mixed strategy profile.
5: Relay node i estimates its payoff u˜ki .
6: Relay node i updates its perception value according to (21).
7: k ← k + 1
8: end while
represents its perceptions about the payoffs of the available pure strategies. In particular, relay node i’s
fully mixed strategies are mapped from the perceptions based on the logit rule:
σia(xi) =
eβxia
eβxiT + eβxiS
(19)
where β is commonly called the temperature of the logit. The temperature has a smoothing effect: when
β → 0 it leads to the uniform choice of strategies, while for β →∞ the probability concentrates on the
pure strategy with the largest perception. We assume throughout that σia is strictly positive for all a ∈ A.
At round k, the perceptions xkia will determine the mixed strategies πki = σi(xki ) that are used by each
player i to choose at random action T (to be active) or S (to be silent). Then each player estimates his
own payoff u˜ki , with no information about the actions or the payoffs of the other players, and uses this
value (u˜ki ) to update its perceptions as:
xk+1ia =
{
(1− γk)xkia + γ
ku˜ki if aki = a
xkia otherwise,
(20)
where γk ∈ (0, 1) is a sequence of averaging factors that satisfy
∑
k γ
k =∞ and
∑
k(γ
k)2 <∞ (examples
of such factor are γk = 1
k
or γk = 1
1+k log k
). A player only changes the perception of the strategy just
used in the current round and keeps other perceptions unchanged. Algorithm (1) summarizes the learning
process. The discrete time stochastic process expressed in (20) represents the evolution of relay node
perceptions and can be written in the following equivalent form:
xk+1ia − x
k
ia = γ
k[wkia − x
k
ia], ∀i ∈ {1, .., N}, a ∈ A (21)
with
wkia =
{
u˜ki if aki = a
xkia otherwise.
(22)
In what follows we will prove that this algorithm can attain a steady state for the coordination process
among players. Also, the information it needs to operate is minimal.
A. Convergence of the Learning Process
Based on the theory of stochastic algorithms, the asymptotic behavior of (21) can be analyzed through
the corresponding continuous dynamics [2]:
dx
dt
= E(w|x)− x, (23)
where x = (xia, ∀i ∈ {1, .., N}, a ∈ A) and w = (wia, ∀i ∈ {1, .., N}, a ∈ A).
Let us make equation (23) more explicit by defining the mapping from the perceptions x to the expected
payoff of user i choosing action a as Gia(x) = E(V i|x, ai = a).
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Proposition 10: The continuous dynamics (23) may be expressed as
dxia
dt
= σia(Gia(x)− xia) (24)
Proof: Using the definition of the vector w, the expected value E(w|x) can be computed by conditioning
on player i’s action as:
E(wia|xia) = πiaU(a, π−i) + (1− πia)xia
= σiaGia(x) + (1− σia)xia (25)
which with (23) yields (24). 
This can be interpreted as follows: when the difference between the expected payoff and the perception
value is large, the perception value, from (21), will be updated with a large expected value wkia− xkia and
this difference will be reduced.
In the following theorem, we prove that the learning process admits a contraction structure with a
proper choice of the temperature β .
Theorem 1: Under the logit decision rule (19), if the temperature satisfies β < 1
nsr
, then the mapping
from the perceptions to the expected payoffs G(x) = [Gia(x), ∀i ∈ {1, .., N}, a ∈ A)] is a maximum-norm
contraction.
Proof: Recall that Gia(x) is the expected payoff of relay node i choosing action a given the perceptions
for all players x. Assume the chosen action is to be active (T ), then GiT (x) can be written as:
GiT (x) =
N∑
j=0
nsrPsucc(T, j)C
N
j (σiT (xi))
j(1− σiT (xi))
N−j − gτ
Now consider the difference GiT (xi) − GiT (xˆi) given two arbitrary perceptions xi and xˆi of a relay
node i :
|GiT (xi)−GiT (xˆi)| = |σiT (xi)
N−1∑
j=1
CN−1j−1 (σiT (xi))
j−1(1− σiT (xi))
N−jU(T, j)
−σˆiT (xˆi)
N−1∑
j=1
CN−1j−1 (σˆiT (xˆi))
j−1(1− σˆiT (xˆi))
N−jU(T, j)|
≤ |σiT (xi)
N−1∑
j=0
nsr
(
CN−1j (σiT (xi))
j(1− σiT (xi))
N−j
)
−σˆiT (xˆi)
N−1∑
j=0
nsr
(
CN−1j (σˆiT (xˆi))
j(1− σˆiT (xˆi))
N−j
)
|
≤ |σiT (xi)nsr − σˆiT (xˆi)nsr|
≤ nsr|σiT (xi)− σˆiT (xˆi)|
We know that σia(xi) is continuously differentiable, then by the mean value theorem, there exists x¯ia =
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δ(xia − xˆia) with 0 < δ < 1 such that:
σiT (xi)− σˆiT (xˆi) =
eβxiT∑
a∈A e
βxia
−
eβxˆiT∑
a∈A e
βxˆia
= β
[eβx¯iT (∑a∈A eβx¯ia)− e2βx¯iT
(
∑
a∈A e
βxia)2
(xiT − xˆiT )−
∑
a
′∈A,a′ 6=T
β
eβx¯ia′ eβx¯iT
(
∑
a∈A e
βxia)2
(xia′ − xˆia′ )
]
= β
[
CT (xiT − xˆiT )−
∑
a
′∈A,a′ 6=T
βCa′ (xia′ − xˆia′ )
]
where CT =
eβx¯iT (
∑
a∈A e
βx¯ia)−e2βx¯iT
(
∑
a∈A e
βxia)2
and Ca′ = e
βx¯
ia
′
eβx¯iT
(
∑
a∈A e
βxia)2
. We can easily observe CT =
∑
a
′∈A,a′ 6=aCa′
and 2Ca ≤ 1. Then:
|σiT (xi)− σˆiT (xˆi)| ≤ βCT |xiT − xˆiT |+
∑
a
′∈A,a′ 6=T
βCa′ |xia′ − xˆia′ |
≤ β(CT +
∑
a
′∈A,a′ 6=T
Ca′ )||xi − xˆi||∞
≤ β||x− xˆ||∞. (26)
Combining (26) and (26), we obtain
|GiT (x)−GiT (xˆ)| ≤ βnsr||x− xˆ||∞
We obtain the same result when player i chooses to be silent (S). Observing that since by the minority
game rule GiT (·)GiS(·) ≤ 0, then if β < 1nsr , indeed G(x) is a maximum-norm contraction. 
Based on the property of contraction mapping, there exists a fixed point x∗ such that G(x∗) = x∗. In
the following theorem we show that the distributed learning algorithm also converges to the same limit
point x∗.
Theorem 2: If G(x) is a ||.||∞-contraction, its unique fixed point x∗ is a global attractor for the adaptive
dynamics (24), and the learning process (21) converges almost surely towards x∗. Moreover the limit point
x∗ is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof: Since G(x) is a ||.||∞-contraction, it admits a unique fixed point x∗. According to general results
on stochastic algorithms the rest points of the continuous dynamic (24) are natural candidates to be limit
point for the stochastic process (21). All together with ([2], corollary 6.6), we have the almost sure
convergence of (21), given that we exhibit a strict Lyaponuv function φ.
Now let φ(x) = ||xia − x∗||∞, then φ(x∗) = 0, φ(x) > 0, ∀x 6= x∗. Let i ∈ {1, ..., N}, a ∈ A be such that
φ(x) = |xia − x∗ia|. If xia ≥ x∗ia, then φ(x) = xia − x∗ia. Since Gia(x) is a maximum norm contraction,
there exist a Lipschitz constant ξ such that Gia(x) − Gia(x∗) ≤ ξ(xia − x∗ia), and Gia(x∗) = x∗ia. All
together combined with equation (24), we can write:
dφ(x)
dt
=
d(xia − x∗ia)
dt
=
dxia
dt
= σia(Gia(x)− xia) = σia(Gia(x)−Gia(x
∗) + x∗ia − xia)
≤ σiaξ(xia − x
∗
ia) + x
∗
ia − xia = −(1− σiaξ)φ(x) < 0, ∀x 6= x
∗.
and a similar argument for the case xia ≤ x∗ia also shows that
dφ(x)
dt
< 0, ∀x 6= x∗. Thus the function φ(x)
is a strict Lyaponuv function and x∗ is globally asymptotically stable, hence the proof. 
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B. Approximate Nash Equilibrium
From lemma (1) and theorem (2), we have:
Gia(x
∗) = E(V i|x∗, ai = a) = x
∗
ia.
This is a property of the equilibrium (x∗) of the distributed learning algorithm: its value x∗ia is an accurate
estimation of the expected payoff in the equilibrium. Moreover we show that the fully mixed strategy
p∗ = (σ∗ia =
eβx
∗
ia
eβx
∗
iT + eβx
∗
iS
, ∀a ∈ A, i ∈ {1...N})
is an approximate Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 11: Under the Logit decision rule (19), the fully mixed strategy p∗ = σ∗(x∗) at the
equilibrium x∗ is a ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium for our game with
ǫ = −
1
β
∑
a∈A
σ∗ia(ln(σ
∗
ia)− 1)
.
Proof: A well-known characterization of the logit probabilities gives:
σia(x
∗) = arg max
σi=[σiT ,σiS ]
∑
a∈A
σiaE(V
i|x∗, ai = a)−
1
β
∑
a∈A
σia(ln(σia)− 1)
=
eβE(V
i|x∗,ai=a)
eβE(V
i|x∗,ai=T ) + eβE(V i|x∗,ai=S)
=
eβx
∗
ia
eβx
∗
iT + eβx
∗
iS
,
and since ([3], pp.93)
max
σi
∑
a∈A
σiaE(V
i|x∗, ai = a)−
1
β
∑
a∈A
σia(ln(σia)− 1) ≤ max
σi
∑
a∈A
σiaE(V
i|x∗, ai = a)
then, we have: ∑
a∈A
σ∗iaE(V
i|x∗, ai = a) ≥ max
σi
∑
a∈A
σiaE(V
i|x∗, ai = a)− ǫ
where ǫ = maxi∈{1...N}{− 1β
∑
a∈A σia(ln(σia)− 1)}.
Hence the fully mixed strategy p∗ = σ∗(x∗) in the equilibrium x∗ is a ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium.

Observe that the parameter ǫ illustrates the effect of the temperature β. A larger ǫ (smaller β) means
worse learning performance.
VII. APPLICATION AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide a numerical analysis of the performance achieved by DTN nodes following
the distributed reinforcement learning mechanism proposed in section VI.
For the rest of the paper, we will assume that relay nodes use the two hop routing scheme, and the
inter-meeting rate between nodes follows an exponential distribution. Furthermore, we assume that upon
successful delivery of a message, the relay node receives a positive reward R if and only if it is the
first one to deliver the message to the corresponding destination. Under these assumptions, we can obtain
the expressions of different quantities: in particular the probability that an active node relays a copy
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of a received packet to destination within time τ is 1 − Qτ where the expression of Qτ is given by :
Qτ = (1 + λτ)e
−λτ . Now, the probability of successful delivery of the message for an active node is:
Psucc(T, kT ) =
1−QkTτ
kT
(27)
such that each node seeks to be the first to deliver a given message to its destination(see [5]).
The performance of our learning algorithm in the homogeneous case is shown in Fig. 6(a). In this
case we consider g = 6.6 × 10−4, N = 40. We set the sequence γk = 1
k
for all iterations k, and the
temperature β →∞, note that this choice of β is a good deal since it allows our algorithm to attain the
Nash equilibrium.
In Fig. 6(a) we observe that the probability to be active for a node i (pi, ∀i ∈ {1...N}) converges to
the symmetric equilibrium (p∗ = 0.35). Moreover, it is interesting to notice that the average number of
active nodes at the equilibrium approaches the value of (Ψ = 15) where Ψ defines the comfort level of
the minority game in pure strategy (Fig. 6(b)). Such behavior is, in fact, a convergence to the strictly fully
mixed Nash equilibrium discussed in proposition (2).
Now we examine the performance of our algorithm in a multi-class framework (device-dependent
heterogeneity), where we consider the existence of two classes of nodes. The parameters λ = 0.03, τ = 100
are used through out the numerical analysis.
The performance of the learning algorithm in the heterogeneous DTN is investigated in two cases,
symmetric (i.e. when g1
r1
= g2
r2
) and asymmetric (g1
r1
6= g2
r2
). We consider first the symmetric case. We
consider first the symmetric case . We consider g1 = 0.8 × 10−4, g2 = 0.5 × 10−4, N1 = 20, N2 = 20
then setting r2 = 0.15 we obtain r1 = 0.24. In Fig. (4)(a) we observe that the probability of being active
of nodes of both classes (p1, p2) converges to the symmetric Nash equilibrium discussed in proposition
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Fig. 4. Learning the fully mixed strategy: heterogeneous symmetric case, where: g1 = 0.8 × 10−4, g2 = 0.5× 10−4, r2 = 0.15.
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Fig. 5. Learning the fully mixed strategy: heterogeneous asymmetric case, where: g1 = 0.8× 10−4, g2 = 0.5× 10−4, r1 = 0.2, r2 = 0.14
which yields Ψ1 = 26,Ψ2 = 28.
(8), and the value it converges to (p∗1 = p∗2 = 0.78) is the solution of the equation (A1(N, p∗1, p∗2) =
A2(N, p
∗
1, p
∗
2) = 0). The average number of active nodes, depicted in Fig (4)(b), converges to Ψ = 30 that
satisfies the relation (9).
In Fig(5), we depict the asymmetric case, when g1 > g2 and r1 < g1r2g2 . In Fig(5)(a) we observe that(p2 > p1), in other words, the nodes with high energy constraint (class 1) are less active, thus by allocating
smaller reward (r1), fewer nodes of class 1 are active. Notice in Fig(5)(b) that the average number of
active nodes Ψ1 ≤ kT < Ψ2.
A summarized numerical validation of our results for the user-dependent incomplete-information sce-
nario is depicted in Fig.(6). In Fig.(6,a), we show existence of the equilibrium threshold (9) and several
of its characteristics. First, we note that function Θ(g) (18) is decreasing in the users’ energy cost g and
increasing with reward R. Second, the equilibrium threshold gth is also increasing in R, which means that
the individual incitement turns into a global incitement despite competition. Third, in Fig.(6,b), we show
the reward setting from the source’s perspective, putting into relation the targeted number of active relays
with expected mean value on users energy costs. Through a joint analysis of Fig.(6,a) and Fig.(6,b) it is
interesting to notice that since the source only knows the mean µ, it might pay more reward to achieve
a performance level that could have been reached with less reward. Indeed, let’s assume for example,
the case Ψ = 20. Given µ = 0.005 and according to Fig.(6,b) the source needs to set a reward R = 10
to incite 20 relay nodes to be active. However, relying on Fig.(6,a), for this case we have gth = 0.0038,
hence the source could have reached the same target number Ψ = 20 with a reward R = 7.6.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 6. On the left, Θ(g) as a function of g and R. On the right, Ψ as a function of µ and R , where: N = 40, τ = 100, λ = 0.03.
VIII. DISCUSSION OF ASSUMPTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this section we discuss the main assumptions that were adopted to yield a tractable model and we
describe limitations and possible extensions.
Mobility pattern: A key challenge in developing our results has been to make general assumptions about
the mobility of DTN nodes. In particular, the properties derived for our incentive mechanism hold under
any homogeneous mobility pattern. Indeed, the large majority of analytical studies are based on some
assumptions on the mobility for the sake of tractability. Early works typically assumed that the cumulative
distribution function of inter contact time decays exponentially over time such as in random waypoint
models. However, extensive empirical mobility traces later show that the CCDF of the inter-contact time
follows approximately a power law over large time range with exponent less than unit [6].
A further assumption to prove convergence of our stochastic approximation algorithm is that nodes
are identical and uniformly visit the entire network space. Experimental data, however, have shown that
mobility patterns of individuals are typically restricted to a given area, and the overall node density is
often largely inhomogeneous. Such models allow studying how DTN routing mechanisms are affected by
highly inhomogeneous node density, diverse mobility patterns and transmission technologies. In future
work, we will adapt our mechanism for cases where heterogeneity is caused under human mobility during
a day. We will study how to model such changes and how routing algorithms can take into account these
time-of-the-day effects. A possible initial model would account for users moving in a periodic manner
over a daily interval, thereby creating some heterogeneity in both time and space.
Buffer management: In our model, we assume that relay nodes have enough capacity to store messages
generated from sources and their copies. But it is clear that, in the context of DTNs, node buffers may
well overflow if no message discarding policy is adopted. In turn, performance measures for DTNs depend
not only on the number of active relay nodes but also on buffer capacity. In this scenario, efficient drop
policies at relay nodes decide which messages should prioritized under capacity constraints regardless of
the specific routing algorithm used.
Delivery probability: A central performance measure studied in DTNs literature is delivery probability.
This measure holds relevant for several applications which may be running over DTNs. However our
scheme can be designed to attain general performance metrics provided that they satisfy assumption A;
for instance, end-to-end delay is such a metric.
Routing and Protocols: We did not address specific protocols for the delivery of messages, rather we
have considered an incentive scheme where only successful relays receive a reward. In turn, this scheme
is indeed general and the proposed framework in principle can work for any DTN routing protocol. But,
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the assumption about how a relay node obtains a reward may limit coordination between relay nodes.
In fact, in order to avoid the use of feedbacks that allow relays to know whether the message has been
successfully delivered or not, we assume that a relay will receive a reward if and only if it is the first
one to deliver the message. Unfortunately, this reward scheme may foster unintended deviant behaviors
in which relay nodes may refuse to forward messages to other relays in order to increase their own utility
[1]. In the future, we will propose a modification of our mechanism that can eliminate this problem by
using some additional rewards between relays in order to incentivize messages propagation between them
[1].
IX. CONCLUSION
In DTNs composed by mobile nodes, not always users will be willing to forward a message to
destination. In fact, it is reasonable that they disregard the service as DTNs relays in order to preserve
batteries. To this respect, the design of an efficient activation control becomes a vital requirement for any
such communication system.
In this paper we have devised a rewarding scheme where relays gain certain rewards that incentive them
to sacrifice memory and battery on DTNs relaying operations. Furthermore, we make a specific effort
such in a way that our mechanism is designed to account for heterogeneous user profiles and devices
energy costs.
Furthermore we argue that any such a coordination scheme should not rely on end to end control message
exchange. DTNs characteristics in fact discourage the usage of timely feedback to enforce cooperative
schemes which may be implemented on mobile nodes. This is a seemingly fundamental obstacle in order
to permit coordination of such systems. To this respect, our paper provides a novel key contribution:
the reward mechanism in fact is designed using the theory of Minority Games (MGs) in order to attain
coordination in distributed fashion. Overall, our scheme covers several possible information scenarios
that sources and relay nodes may face in reality, ranging from full state information to imperfect state
information and applies to general intermeeting distributions for nodes contacts.
Also, in order to prove the correctness of our incentive mechanism, we have provided a complete
characterization of the equilibria of the baseline MG in the case of heterogeneous DTNs. Finally, the core
machinery to attain feedback-less coordination is based on a learning algorithm that involves stochastic
approximations: our algorithm provably drives the system to the aforementioned equilibria while requiring
just local estimations of system parameters performed at mobile relay nodes.
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